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Property Law--State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation-From
Junkyards to Residences?
Since 1900, the population of the United States has tripled.1 With this
expansion has come an increase in the pollution, instability, and congestion of
cities, as well as an increasing awareness of the need for controlling these neg-
ative byproducts of rapid growth.2 Since the Supreme Court's approval of
zoning in 1926,3 all states have authorized their local governments to zone4 in
order to promote "public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Most
jurisdictions, however, have prohibited the use of zoning solely for aesthetic
purposes, on the grounds either that aesthetic concerns bear no relation to
health, safety, morals, or general welfare6 or that aesthetically based ordi-
nances are simply too subjective to enforce without caprice.7 Nevertheless,
within the last decade, several courts have approved "aesthetic zoning." The
1. See NEWSPAPER ENTER. AsS'N, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1983 210
(1983). The population in 1900 was 75,994,575. By 1980 it had increased to 226,504,825.
2. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.01, at 1-6 to -14 (4th ed. 1975).
Among the reasons cited for early zoning ordinances were increasing density of population, multi-
plying forms of industry, protection of quiet neighborhoods, control of pollution, and prevention
of haphazard growth that could reduce property values and the overall attractiveness of a commu-
nity. Id.
3. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also infra notes 34-41
and accompanying text.
4. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.19 (2d ed. 1976).
5. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). To be a proper exercise
of the police power, the Constitution requires that the ordinance promote the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. Id. See also State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971):
The police power of the State extends to all the compelling needs of the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. Likewise, the liberty protected by the Due Process
and Law of the Land Clauses of the Federal and State constitutions extends to all funda-
mental rights of the individual. It is the function of the courts to establish the location of
the dividing line between the two ....
Id at 497, 176 S.E.2d at 457. See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887):
It belongs to [the legislature] to exert what are known as the police powers of the State,
and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection
of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety. It does not at all follow that
every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends, is to be accepted as a
legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. . . . If, therefore, a statute purport-
ing to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, .. it is the duty of the courts
to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
.d. at 661. For further discussion of the police power, see infra note 15 and text accompanying
notes 38-46.
6. See, e.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909); People v. Dicken-
son, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959); Crawford v. City of
Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 P. 476 (1893); Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 193 N.W. 326 (1940);
Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921). See generally 3 P. ROHAN, ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.03 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Mayor & Council v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 129 A. 512 (1925); State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Village of Willmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131 (1934); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Il,
166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932). Cf. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281
Minn. 492, 498, 162 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1968). See generally Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder:
Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1438 (1971).
8. Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aes-
thetic.Reulation, 48 UMKC L. REv. 125 (1980). Since 1972 eleven courts have joined the grow-
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North Carolina Supreme Court, which had long prohibited aesthetic zoning,
recently joined this developing trend in State v. Jones.9 While this decision
will help municipalities preserve a pleasant environment for the public, there
is a danger that North Carolina courts will extend the approval of aesthetic
zoning to situations involving mere differences in taste. Although Jones may
satisfactorily cover regulation of billboards, junkyards, and other eyesores, it
may not be an appropriate precedent for regulation of architecture, particu-
larly residential architecture.
State v. Jones arose from the arrest of Mack Jones for violating a Bun-
combe County ordinance that restricted the location ofjunkyards within unin-
corporated areas of the county.' 0 The ordinance required junkyard owners to
erect an opaque fence I six feet high to surround any junkyard within a "resi-
dential area."' 12 Jones filed a motion to quash the arrest warrant on grounds
that the ordinance was unconstitutional, 13 arguing that because the ordinance
was based solely on aesthetic concerns, it lacked sufficient relation to the pub-
lic health, safety, or general welfare. 14 Therefore, argued Jones, the county
lacked authority under the police power 15 to zone for this purpose, and had
ing body of authority permitting zoning based solely on aesthetic considerations. See
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980),
modYed 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Veterans of Foreign Wars v. City of Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo.
44, 575 P.2d 835, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978); City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Advertising
Ass'n, 414 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1982); City of Champaign v. Kroger Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 498, 410
N.E.2d 661 (1980); John Donnely & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d
709 (1975); National Used Cars v. City of Kalamazoo, 61 Mich. App. 520, 233 N.W.2d 64 (1975);
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Roberts Enters., 305 So. 2d 637 (Miss. 1974); State v. Bern-
hard, 173 Mont. 464, 568 P.2d 136 (1977); Dockwatch Hollow Quarry Pit v. Township of Warren,
142 N.J. Super. 103, 361 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 1976), af'd, 74 N.J. 312, 377 A.2d 1201 (1977); State
v. Smith, 618 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1981); Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975). For the posi-
tions of other jurisdictions on aesthetic zoning, see infra note 23.
9. 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982). In several decisions following its holding in State v.
Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959), the supreme court had either reaffirmed its prohibition
of aesthetic zoning, or simply declined to address the question. As recently as 1979, the court had
declined "to endorse such a broad concept of the scope of the police power." A-S-P Assocs. v.
City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 216, 258 S.E.2d 444, 450 (1979). For a discussion of the history of
North Carolina case law in this area, see infra text accompanying notes 55-78.
10, 305 N.C. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 676. The ordinance prohibited junkyards near public
roads or schools, or within residential areas.
1 I. Id. at 522, 290 S.E.2d at 676. The ordinance provided: "said junkyard or automobile
graveyard shall be entirely surrounded by a fence, or by a wire fence and substantial vegetation of
sufficient height and density as to prevent as nearly as is practical any contents of said junkyard
from being visible from the public road or residence." Id (quoting Buncombe County Ordinance
No. 16401).
12. Id. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Buncombe County Ordinance No. 16401). The
ordinance defined a "residential area" as "twenty-five (25) or more housing units within a geo-
graphical area comprised of a one-fourth (1/4) mile wide strip contiguous and parallel to the
external boundary lines of the tract of real property on which said automobile graveyard or junky-
ard is located ...."
13. 1d. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 676.
14. See id. at 523, 290 S.E.2d at 676. Jones also claimed that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tionally vague. Id The supreme court rejected this argument, concluding that "when read con-
textually [the ordinance] apprises persons of ordinary intelligence, who desire to know the law and
abide by it, what is required by it." Id. at 531, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
15. "The state possesses the police power in its capacity as sovereign, and in the exercise
thereof the Legislature may enact laws, within constitutional limits, to protect or promote the
health, morals,. . . safety and general welfare of society." State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 694,
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violated his rights under the "law of the land" clause of the North Carolina
Constitution 16 and due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by deny-
ing him his desired use of the land.17
The superior court agreed with this argument and accordingly granted the
motion.18 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.' 9 In so doing, the
court of appeals recognized that the ordinance was based on aesthetic reasons
alone, and that the supreme court had consistently prohibited this type of zon-
ing.20 Nevertheless, the court determined that dicta expressed in several
supreme court cases had indicated a trend toward permitting aesthetic zoning,
and that cases in which the court had refused to uphold such zoning were no
longer controlling precedent.2 '
Indeed, the supreme court had become more tolerant of aesthetic zoning,
for it affirmed the court of appeals. 22 In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Branch, the court observed that the majority of jurisdictions that had ad-
dressed the issue now permit aesthetic zoning,23 and that four courts had re-
114 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1960). This power may be delegated to municipalities, but since zoning is an
exercise of this delegated police power, they too must protect or promote the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. See Southern Ry. v. City of Winston-Salem, 275 N.C. 465, 168 S.E.2d
396 (1969); infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, Supra note 2,
§§ 2.02-.08, at 2-7 to -14. Enforcement of an ordinance that lacks sufficient relation to these public
interests constitutes a taking for which compensation must be paid. See State v. Vestal, 281 N.C.
517, 189 S.E.2d 152 (1972).
16. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19 ("No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his free-
hold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty,
or property,- but by the law of the land."). The term "law of the land" is synonymous with "due
process of law" as used in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In re
Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976). A United States Supreme Court decision construing
the due process clause, however, does not control the North Carolina Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the law of the land clause. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206
S.E.2d 141 (1974).
17. State v. Jones, 305 N.C. at 523, 290 S.E.2d at 677. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I
("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law...").
18. 305 N.C. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 676.
19. State v. Jones, 53 N.C. App. 466, 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981), af'd, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675
(1982).
20. Id. at 469-70, 281 S.E.2d at 93-94.
21. Id. For a discussion of prior North Carolina case law, see infra text accompanying notes
55-78.
22. 305 N.C. at 531, 290 S.E.2d at 681-82.
23. Id. at 526-27, 290 S.E.2d at 679. Including North Carolina, nineteen jurisdictions now
permit regulation based solely on aesthetics, seven prohibit it, sixteen have not answered the ques-
tion definitively, and nine have reported no cases on aesthetic regulation.
In addition to those listed supra note 8, these jurisdictions permit zoning based solely on
aesthetics: Delaware (Franklin Builders v. Sartin, 58 Del. 173, 207 A.2d 12 (Del. Super. Ct.
1964)); District of Columbia (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)); Hawaii (State v. Diamond
Motors, 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967)); New York (Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Village of
Fairport, 84 A.D.2d 455, 446 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1982)); North Carolina; Ohio (State v. Buckley, 16
Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 163 (1969)); Oregon (Perkins v.
Marion County, 252 Or. 313, 448 P.2d 374 (1968)); and Wisconsin (Racine County v. Plourde, 38
Wis. 2d 403, 157 N.W.2d 591 (1968)).
The following jurisdictions prohibit zoning based solely on aesthetics: Maryland (Montgom-
ery County v. Citizens Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 20 Md. App. 484, 316 A.2d 322 (1974)); Nebraska
(Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N.W. 326 (1940)); Pennsylvania (White Advertising
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cently upheld regulation of junkyards based solely on aesthetics.24 In
justifying their approval of aesthetic zoning, these courts had cited modem
societal concerns for environmental protection, control of pollution, and elimi-
nation of discordant or unsightly surroundings.25 Although the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court had formerly limited exercise of the police power to
measures promoting the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the pub-
lic, it agreed that these modem concerns "may constitute a valid basis for the
exercise of police power."26
Concerned that the decision should not lead to arbitrary and unreasona-
ble regulation, however, the court limited the power to zone solely for aes-
thetic reasons to situations in which the gain to the public outweighs the
diminution in value of the individual's property.2 7 Private concerns to be con-
sidered include "whether the regulation results in confiscation of the most sub-
stantial part of the value of the property or deprives the property owner of the
property's reasonable use."28 To be balanced against these private concerns
are:
the purpose of the regulation and the manner in achieving a permit-
ted purpose, [as well as possible] corollary benefits to the general
community such as protection of property values, promotion of tour-
ism, indirect protection of health and safety, preservation of the char-
acter and integrity of the community, and promotion of the comfort,
happiness, and emotional stability of area residents. 29
The court also warned local governments not to delegate responsibility
for promulgating aesthetic zoning ordinances to organizations the legislature
Metro v. Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. Commw. -, 453 A.2d 29 (1982)); Rhode Island (City of
Providence v. Stephens, 47 R.I. 387, 133 A. 614 (1926)); Texas (City of Houston v. Johnny Frank's
Auto Parts Co., 480 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)); Vermont (Vermont Salvage Corp. v.
Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943)); and Virginia (Board of Supervisors v.
Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975)).
The following jurisdictions have not answered the question definitively: Arkansas, Connecti-
cut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia. For a discussion of the state of the law in
these jurisdictions, see Bufford, supra note 8, at 151-62. This group also includes Georgia
(Rockdale County v. Mitchell's Used Auto Parts, 243 Ga. 465, 254 S.E.2d 846 (1979)) and Maine
(Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham, 451 A.2d 308 (Me. 1982) (holding that aesthetic considera-
tions, fear of depreciation in the value of neighboring properties, and concern over an adverse
impact on the town's tax base are legitimate bases for exercise of the zoning power, but not decid-
ing whether aesthetics alone would be a sufficient basis)).
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Wyoming have reported no cases on aesthetic regulation. See Bufford, supra note 8, at 130-31.
24. 305 N.C. at 528-30, 290 S.E.2d at 679-80.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 530-31, 290 S.E.2d at 681. The court did not specify whether aesthetic zoning
promotes the general welfare, or whether it was expanding the police power beyond the traditional
factors of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare to include promotion of aesthetic
values. Its mention of the traditional factors as possible corollary benefits of aesthetic zoning,
however, suggests the latter. See infra text accompanying note 29.
27. 305 N.C. at 530-31, 290 S.E.2d at 681. For a criticism of this balancing test, see infra
notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
28. 305 N.C. at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
29. Id.
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has not authorized to exercise the police power.30 This warning also appar-
ently stemmed from the court's desire that local governments avoid arbitrari-
ness in aesthetic zoning.
Thus, if an organization that is authorized to exercise the police power
promulgates a zoning ordinance that promotes the public interest, without
causing greater diminution in the individual's property value, the court will
uphold its constitutionality. To understand the impact of this decision, one
must consider the relatively short history of zoning.
As cities grew in the late 1800s and early 1900s, apartment houses, facto-
ries, garages, stables, and other discordant structures were built in close prox-
imity to residential areas regardless of their harm to neighborhoods and
communities, or to the public safety, morals, welfare, or values. 31 Only piece-
meal ordinances and individual nuisance actions regulated this develop-
ment.32 As growth continued and the problem became apparent, cities began
to realize the need for more efficacious means of control. In 1916, New York
City adopted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States. 33
Ten years later, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Really Co. ,34 the Supreme Court
authorized comprehensive zoning in general. In Village of Euclid, a property
owner had sued for an injunction restraining enforcement of a recently
adopted comprehensive zoning ordinance.35 Plaintiff argued that enforcement
of the ordinance would reduce the value of his property, depriving him of
liberty and property in violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.36 The district court found the ordi-
nance unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement, but the Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the ordinance promoted the public health, safety, and
general welfare.37
The Court recognized the need for limitations, however. Because zoning
restricts the use of land, and often lowers its value, the Court required the state
30. Id. at 531, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
31. See E. BASSETT, ZONING 23-26 (1936); 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, § 1.01, at 1-6 to -8.
32. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, § 3.07; P. GREEN, ZONING IN NORTH CAROLINA 14-19
(1952). In order to recover under a nuisance theory in North Carolina, a party must show a
substantial nontrespassory invasion of his interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. One
is liable for an intentional invasion when his conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances.
One is liable for an unintentional invasion when his conduct is negligent, reckless, or ul-
trahazardous. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953).
33. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, § 3.07. The New York ordinance was "comprehensive" in
that it was not intended to apply to particular landowners or parts of the city, but instead was
adopted pursuant to a plan for the entire city. For a description of this plan, see S. MAKIELSKI,
THE POLITICS OF ZONING: THE NEw YORK ExPERIENCE (1966). Today, most jurisdictions per-
mit zoning ordinances only when adopted pursuant to a comprehensive plan. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-383 (1982). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, §§ 5.02-.07; 1 P. ROMIAN,
supra note 6, § 1.0213]. Upon a finding that an ordinance was not passed pursuant to a compre-
hensive plan, courts generally will rule it invalid as arbitrary, discriminatory "spot zoning." See,
e.g., Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972). See also I R. ANDERSON,
supra note 4, § 5.08.
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).--
35. Id at 379-84.
36. Id at 384.
37. Id at 395.
[Vol. 61
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to demonstrate some compelling interest to overcome an individual's rights
under the fourteenth amendment. 38 In effect, the Court pitted the state's rights
under the police power against the individual's right to use and enjoy his prop-
erty.39 If an ordinance's provisions "are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare," it will be declared unconstitutional.4° Thus, Village of Euclid neces-
sitates case-by-case analysis of specific applications of a particular ordinance
to ensure that it represents a legitimate exercise of the police power.4 1
This declaration of constitutional validity prompted many state courts to
approve zoning in principle, at least in those jurisdictions where legislatures
had authorized municipalities to zone.42 Municipalities in many other juris-
dictions, however, remained powerless to zone. Because the police power rests
initially with the state, municipalities could not enact zoning ordinances ab-
sent delegation from the state.4 3 Although some states quickly followed New
York's example in authorizing their municipalities to zone, authorization be-
came widespread only after the Village of Euclid decision. 44 Authorization
came in the form of zoning enabling acts, frequently patterned after the New
York act and a standard act prepared by the Department of Commerce in
1926. 45 The movement spread quickly; by the mid-Thirties virtually every
state had passed such an act.46
While authorizing municipalities to zone, these zoning enabling acts also
limited the scope of the municipalities' power.4 7 Since the power to zone is
merely delegated, the limitations of an enabling act are effectively the limita-
tions of the municipality.48 Thus, in determining the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance, courts must consider not only the scope of the police power, but also
38. Id at 384-88.
39. See Ad at 387.
40. Id at 395.
41. See id The Court stated:
It is true that, when, if ever, the provisions set forth in the ordinance in tedious and
minute detail, come to be concretely applied to particular premises, including those of
the appellee, or to particular conditions, or to be considered in connection with specific
complaints, some of them, or even many of them, may be found to be clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable.
Id In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Supreme Court illustrated this case-
by-case analysis, holding a particular application of an ordinance unconstitutional. AfterNectow,
it was primarily the state courts that assumed the case-by-case analysis. I R. ANDERSON, supra
note 4, § 3.11.
42. See P. GREEN, supra note 32, at 53.
43. See State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 369, 211 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1975); Algood v. Town of
Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 437, 189 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1972). See generally I A. RATHKOPF, supra note
2, § 2.01.
44. P. GREEN, supra note 32, at 52-53.
45. Id at 52. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, §§ 2.21-.29 (discussing the components
of the Standard Act and its influence).
46. P. GREEN, supra note 32, at 52.
47. See Harrington & Co. v. Renner, 236 N.C. 321, 72 S.E.2d 838 (1952); 1 A. RATHKOPF,
supra note 2, § 2.01.
48. See, e.g., Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); Dale v. City of
Morganton, 270 N.C. 567, 155 S.E.2d 136 (1967).
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the precise terms of the jurisdiction's zoning enabling act.49 Typically, an en-
abling act includes a statement of purpose; a specification of areas and struc-
tures subject to the zoning power; an authorization to create districts to be
regulated uniformly; and guidelines for adoption, amendment, and repeal of
ordinances and for the establishment of a board of adjustment.50 Often the
act incorporates the limitation on the police power in its statement of purposes
for which the zoning power may be exercised. 51 In this way, compliance with
the scope of the enabling act usually indicates compliance with the scope of
the police power, but a municipality must exercise care to ensure compliance
with both.
Originally promulgated in 1923 as one of the earliest enabling acts, the
North Carolina Zoning Enabling Act includes many of the provisions men-
tioned above.52 Also included are a number of references to the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the public, with provisions limiting the use of
zoning to measures designed to promote these interests. 53 Soon after promul-
gation of the enabling act, the North Carolina Supreme Court readily ap-
proved zoning in principle, 54 but difficult questions arose when the court
began considering exactly what type of zoning the enabling act permitted.
One such question was whether the provisions of the act authorized zoning
solely for aesthetic purposes. More specifically, the question was reduced to
whether protection of an aesthetically pleasing environment through zoning
promotes the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.
The supreme court considered this question twice within fifteen years af-
49. See, e.g., Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 281 N.C. 715, 190 S.E.2d 175
(1972); Heaton v. City of Charlotte, 277 N.C. 506, 178 S.E.2d 352 (1971); Zopfi v. City of Wil-
mington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
50. See I R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, §§ 2.21-.29.
51. Id. Both the original New York enabling act and the Standard Zoning Enabling Act
included reference to promotion of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Their
influence caused most states to include similiar language in their acts. See id. §§ 2.21-.29, 3.07; E.
BASSET, ZONING 133 (1936).
52. See Act of Mar. 5, 1923, ch. 250, 1923 PUB. LAWS OF N.C. 572-76 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 160A-381 to -389 (1982)). Aside from certain changes in procedure and in the powers
and composition of the Board of Adjustment, and in the recently conferred right to create historic
districts, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-395 to -400 (1982), the 1923 zoning enabling act remains rela-
tively unchanged. The legislature has also authorized counties to zone. N.C. GErN. STAT.
§§ 153A-340 to -348 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1982). G.S. 160A-383 states in part that "zoning regu-
lations shall be ... designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic
and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to
prevent the overcrowding of land." In the general grant of power to zone, G.S. 160A-381
provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the com-
munity, any city is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots that may be
occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and
the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or
other purpose.
54. Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931). The court had appeared
willing to assume the constitutionality of zoning five years earlier in its first zoning case. See
Harden v. City of Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 135 S.E. 151 (1926) (apparently approving several provi-
sions of the enabling act, but the constitutionality of zoning was not raised on appeal).
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ter passage of the enabling act. In MacRae v. City of Fayetteville the court
asserted that "the law does not allow asthetic tastes to control private property
under the guise of the police power,"5 5 and struck down an ordinance prohib-
iting operation of gas stations near dwelling units.56 Ten years later, however,
in In re Appeal of Parker, the court upheld a setback ordinance even though
the ordinance primarily promoted aesthetic concerns.5 7 Parker had con-
structed a wall in excess of the height restrictions on walls and fences located
in his zoning district. After the city building inspector ordered him to remove
the wall, Parker petitioned the court to block the order on grounds that as
applied to his wall, the ordinance lacked substantial relation to the public
health, safety, or general welfare.58 Although concluding that structures close
to the street might obstruct drivers' views and impede the work of firemen, the
court also stated that "while aesthetic considerations are by no means control-
ling, it is not inappropriate to give some weight to them in determining the
reasonableness of the law under consideration." 59
While this opinion suggested a willingness on the part of the North Caro-
lina court to consider aesthetic purposes in determining the validity of an ordi-
nance, in Berman v. Parker60 the United States Supreme Court went further.
Though the case involved an eminent domain proceeding, in dictum the Court
discussed the police power:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and or-
der-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the tradi-
tional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they
merely illustrate the scope of the power, and do not delimit it ....
. . . The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
The values it represents are spiritual as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.6'
55. 198 N.C. 51, 54, 150 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1929).
56. Id at 55, 150 S.E. at 812. The court also established itself as the final authority on the
validity of an ordinance or statute, stating:
A determination by the Legislature [as] to what is a proper exercise of the police power is
not final and conclusive, however, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. For, as
has already been stated, the mere assertion by the Legislature that a statute relates to the
public health, safety and welfare, does not of itself bring such statute within the police
power of the state.
Id. at 56, 150 S.E. at 813 (quoting 6 RULING CASE LAW Constitutional Law § 229, at 241-42 (M.
McKinney & B. Rich eds. 1915)).
57. 214 N.C. 51, 197 S.E. 706, appeal dismissed sub nom. Parker v. City of Greensboro, 305
U.S. 568 (1938). Setback ordinances restrict construction of buildings to areas beyond a specified
distance from the street. The ordinance in Parker provided that "no part of any building or
structure shall be within 25 feet of any street line in any residence district." Id. at 52, 197 S.E. at
707 (quoting ordinance).
58. Id at 54, 197 S.E. at 709.
59. Id. at 57, 197 S.E. at 710.
60. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
61. Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted). Any doubt as to whether Berman should be limited to
eminent domain cases ended when the Supreme Court cited it in two zoning cases. Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of an ordinance
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This language prompted some jurisdictions to uphold aesthetic zoning,
but North Carolina was not among them.62 In State v. Brown,63 decided five
years after Berman, the supreme court declared unconstitutional a state statute
requiring fences around junkyards operated within 150 yards of a paved high-
way. The court conceded that the statute might remotely protect the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, but found no "real or substantial
relation" to these interests. 64 According to the court, the legislature's actual
intent was to provide attractive highways, a purely aesthetic concern insuffi-
cient to support exercise of the police power.
65
After reaffirming the Brown holding one year later in Little Pep Delmonico
Restaurant v. City of Charlotte,66 the court displayed a slowly increasing ac-
ceptance of aesthetic zoning during the ensuing twenty years. For example, in
Horton v. Gulledge the court quoted from Berman and termed its reasoning
"persuasive," but asserted that Berman did not control North Carolina courts'
interpretations of the "law of the land" clause in the North Carolina Constitu-
tion y7 Two years later, in State v. Vestal, the State argued that an ordinance
requiring erection of a fence around a junkyard promoted the public safety.68
Finding no "reasonable basis for supposing that the restriction imposed will
promote such safety," the court declared the restriction unconstitutional as a
deprivation of property without due process of law.69 In dictum, however, the
court acknowledged the growing number ofjurisdictions that permitted purely
aesthetic zoning, but found it unnecessary to determine the issue since the
State had not raised it.
70
During the next ten years, as the number of courts permitting aesthetic
zoning continued to increase,7 ' the supreme court was not asked to reconsider
its position, though indications of a potential change in position continued. In
A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh the court upheld an ordinance regulating
the external appearance of houses within an historical district in Raleigh.
72
The court reasoned that this regulation differed from purely aesthetic regula-
tion in that it promoted the general welfare by promoting economic and social
stability, architectural creativity, and tourism. 73 The court in dicta reiterated
prohibiting the erection and display of off-premises billboards); Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
62. See 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 6, § 16.05.
63. 250 N.C. 54, 60, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1959).
64. Id. at 59, 108 S.E.2d at 77-78.
65. Id., 108 S.E.2d at 77.
66. 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting
business signs over sidewalks in designated areas of the city).
67. 277 N.C. 353, 359, 177 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1970).
68. 281 N.C. 517, 189 S.E.2d 152 (1972).
69. Id. at 522-23, 189 S.E.2d at 156-57.
70. Id. at 524, 189 S.E.2d at 157. The dictum was particularly strong. After stating that it
was expressing no opinion on the subject, the court cited cases from eight jurisdictions that permit-
ted zoning for aesthetic reasons alone.
71. See supra notes 8 & 23.
72. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
73. Id. at 216-17, 257 S.E.2d at 450. This writer questions the degree to which historical
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its acknowledgement of the growing number of jurisdictions permitting aes-
thetic zoning, but declared that it was "not prepared to endorse such a broad
concept of the scope of the police power."'74
The court of appeals was prepared to endorse this concept, however. In
Cumberland County v. Eastern Federal Corp. the court noted Berman and the
string of supportive North Carolina dicta, and upheld a county ordinance re-
stricting the location of billboards. 75 It refused to authorize aesthetic zoning
in all cases, but held that the "ordinance in this case could lawfully be based
upon aesthetic considerations. '76 Apparently unwilling to break completely
from the traditional rule, the court accepted as an additional justification that
the ordinance protected property values and the public safety.7 7 Thus, not
until deciding State v. Jones78 did the court of appeals gather the courage to
uphold aesthetic zoning without mentioning a relation to the traditional no-
tion of the public health, safety, or general welfare.
Much of the aversion to aesthetic zoning had reflected concern over its
"subjective" nature.79 Courts rejecting aesthetic zoning essentially assumed
that an ordinance which promoted aesthetic concerns necessarily favored the
tastes of one individual or group over those of another, resulting in capricious
regulation.80 As the population continued to grow, however, many structures
and practices developed that the public increasingly condemned as "eyesores."
Junkyards and billboards might legitimately fall into this category. The ex-
panding interest in preservation and environmental legislation in recent years
indicates a growing concern that the environment remain as attractive as prac-
ticable.8 ' Because of the general agreement on their unattractiveness, and the
relative specificity with which ordinances regulating them may be drafted, it
appears particularly appropriate to subject billboards, junkyards, and other
structures commonly recognized as eyesores to the exercise of the police
district zoning promotes social stability and architectural creativity, but finds it significant that the
court mentioned promotion of architectural creativity as a legitimate goal of zoning.
74. Id. at 216, 258 S.E.2d at 450.
75. 48 N.C. App. 518, 269 S.E.2d 672, review denied, 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 527 (1980).
76. Id. at 524, 269 S.E.2d at 676.
77. Id., 269 S.E.2d at 677. In concluding that the ordinance promoted public safety, the court
cited the "common knowledge that uncontrolled display of billboards and signs can distract
travelling motorists and thereby create hazards to vehicular traffic and to pedestrians." Id. Such
reasoning has been used by many courts to uphold aesthetically based ordinances on the tradi-
tional grounds of promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. See generally, 3
P. ROHAN, supra note 6, § 16.0412] & nn.14-18.
78. 53 N.C. App. 466, 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981), aj'd, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
79. See I A. RATHKOPF, SUpra note 2, § 14.01, at 14-5 to -11.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976). The intention of Congress in
passing these acts was to maintain natural scenery near the nation's highways. See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-451 to -455 (1982), which authorizes municipalities and counties to create Commu-
nity Appearance Commissions responsible for plans and programs that would "improve the visual
quality and aesthetic characteristics of the municipality or county." Id § 160A-452. See also
Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[I]n an age in which the preservation
of the quality of our environment has become a national goal, concern for aesthetics seems even
more urgent.").
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power.82 As applied to these problems, State v. Jones is a welcome
development.
As applied to structures not so commonly condemned, State v. Jones may
cause promulgation of ordinances that unreasonably infringe upon the tradi-
tional right of a property owner to use his land as he desires. Most notable is
the potential establishment of architectural standards for residential housing.
Municipalities in other jurisdictions have established architectural review
boards to ensure that new housing either conforms to specifications established
by the city government, or does not differ significantly from the existing archi-
tecture in the area.83 When not designed to assist an historical district zoning
plan, these architectural controls promote primarily aesthetic concerns, and
the choice becomes one solely between competing tastes.84
An Ohio Court of Appeals decision, Reid v. Architectural Board of Re-
view, 5 illustrates the unreasonable restraints on expression of personal taste
that may arise from enforcement of such ordinances. In Reid plaintiff had
sought permission to build a modem one-story house surrounded by trees and
a wall in a neighborhood of "dignified, stately and conventional structures,
two and one-half stories high. ''8 6 Although Reid undoubtedly considered the
design attractive, the board denied approval because it "[did] not conform to
the character of the houses in the area."87 As one board member explained:
"Our issue was the fact that it was a single story house in a multi-story neigh-
82. See United Advertising v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964) (noting
the "widely held" opinion that billboards are incongruous with the appearance of other proper-
ties). Certainly, the extent of agreement on what constitutes a billboard or junkyard exceeds that
on what constitutes an architectural style conforming with others in the neighborhood. Because of
this agreement, municipalities can draft ordinances regulating billboards and junkyards with more
specificity. See generally Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1438 (1973) and
cases and studies cited therein.
83. See, e.g., Pacesetter Homes v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 I11. App. 2d 218, 219, 244
N.E.2d 369, 370 (1968); State ex rel. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Mo. 1970); Board
of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 145, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975); R. BABCOCK, BILLBOARDS,
GLASS HOUSES AND THE LAW 6 (1977) (citing Dade County, Fla.; Danville, Ill.; and Riverside
County, Cal. as examples of communities that have passed ordinances requiring architectural
styles to conform with others in the vicinity).
84. See Kolis, Architural Expression: Police Power and the First Amendment, 16 URn. L.
ANN. 273, 287 n.55 (1979). Some authorities cite protection of property values as another basis for
architectural controls. Eg., State ex rel. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo. 1970):
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 270-71, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222
(1955); Turnbull, Aesthetic Zoning, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 230, 243-53 (1971). This may be a
legitimate argument in controlling grossly discordant architecture. But see infra note 98 and ac-
companying text.
85. 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963). See also State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458
S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (approving city's creation of architectural board with power to deny build-
ing permits to construct houses the board believes lack conformity with the design of surrounding
structures); Oregon City v. Hartke, 24 Or. 35, 46, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (1965) ("[T]here is a rowing
judicial recognition of the power of a city to impose zoning restrictions which can be justified
solely upon the ground that they will tend to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly sur-
roundings."); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217
(upholding a village zoning ordinance that prohibited the issuance of a building permit pending
approval of the exterior architecture of a proposed building by a building board that determined
whether the proposed building could diminish the value of surrounding properties), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 841 (1955).
86. 119 Ohio App. at 70, 192 N.E.2d at 77.
87. Id at 68, 192 N.E.2d at 75 (quoting the board of review's order).
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borhood .... We don't like the appearance of that house in this neighbor-
hood."88 The court upheld the board's decision.8 9
In a society in which an increasing number of people are unable to own a
home, concern for conformity should not so limit those who can. One of the
fruits of owning property should be the opportunity to use it as the owner
pleases, so long as his or her use does not harm others.90 In Reid the only
apparent harm to others was that the planned house offended their idea of
aesthetic attractiveness--conformity. The court permitted this desire for con-
formity to override a property owner's desire to express her tastes by building
a home she considered attractive.
Some commentators would limit this practice by extending first amend-
ment rights to architectural expression.9 1 While such an inquiry is beyond the
scope of this note, language from cases in which the Supreme Court granted
first amendment rights to artistic and other nonverbal expression suggests a
legitimate possibility of eventual protection of architectural expression as
well.92 Regardless of possible first amendment protection, however, courts
should give some weight to property owners' interests in building homes they
find aesthetically pleasing.
Nevertheless, if North Carolina's courts extend State v. Jones to regula-
tion of residential architecture, property owners interested in building homes
will receive no more protection than Reid received. One reason is the general
rule the court laid down-zoning based solely on aesthetic considerations is a
valid exercise of police power.93 Moreover, courts applying Jones might ne-
glect to apply the balancing test and simply cite the general rule. In R. 0. Giv-
ens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head94 the court of appeals appears to have done
just that. In Givens, the court approved an ordinance banning off-premises
commercial signs, citing Jones for the proposition that aesthetics "constitute a
legitimate consideration in the exercise of the police power." 95 The court also
88. Id at 73-74, 192 N.E.2d at 79 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (quoting from the trial record).
89. I d at 72, 192 N.E.2d at 78.
90. A maxim of property law that describes the courts' traditional approach to the rights of a
property owner is Sic utere ut alienum non laedas: "Use your own property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 1238 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). At one time
this maxim defined the extent of a property owner's duty to others in the use of his property.
While zoning has restricted the application of this principle, it should not be disregarded entirely.
91. See, e.g., Kolis,supra note 84; Williams, Subjectivity, Expression andPrivacy: Problems of
Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 179 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (in determining whether allegedly
obscene material deserves first amendment protection the court established the test of whether the
object lacks "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value"). Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The actor on stage or screen, the artist whose creation is
in oil or clay or marble ... are beneficiaries of freedom of expression."). See generally, Note,
supra note 91, at 182-88, which suggests other bases for extension of first amendment protection to
architecture--e.g., rights to self-expression and symbolic expression. The author also discusses
whether architecture is art, concluding that it has long been recognized as such. Id at 182 &
nm.l 1-14.
93. 305 N.C. at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
94. 58 N.C. App. 697, 294 S.E.2d 388 (1982).
95. Id. at 701, 294 S.E.2d at 391.
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stated: "We have examined the zoning scheme and stated objectives of the
town and we find the off-premises advertising restriction to be within the po-
lice power of the municipal government. '96 In limiting its examination to the
zoning scheme and stated objectives of the town, the court applied only one
side of the balancing test, circumventing the supreme court's desire for a limi-
tation upon its general rule.
Even if North Carolina courts apply the balancing test, its limiting effect
is insufficient to avoid a result like that reached in Reid. Under the Jones test,
the property owner must show that enforcement of the ordinance would result
in a diminution of his property's value that outweighs all the subjective bene-
fits to the public-i.e., "promotion of tourism, preservation of the character
and integrity of the community, promotion of the comfort, happiness, and
emotional stability of area residents." 97 In barring a property owner from
building a house that does not conform to others in the neighborhood, the
ordinance has not caused a diminution in the property's value. The subjective
value has been reduced, but the property owner is still free to build a con-
forming house that would not reduce his property's value.
Of course, architecture can be so discordant or offensive that it does lower
the value of nearby property. Municipalities should be permitted to regulate
such architecture in their exercise of the police power. Often, however, the
"nonconforming" architecture does not actually lower surrounding property
values; in some cases the courts have simply assumed the architecture had this
effect.98 In applying the balancing test, if a court limits its consideration of
private loss to the diminution of property value, it should similarly limit its
consideration of the effect on the public to potential diminution in property
value, and require proof of this diminution.99 On the other hand, if a court
insists on considering such values as the character and integrity of the commu-
nity and the comfort and happiness of the public, it should also consider the
comfort and happiness of an individual who is allowed to build a house that
he finds aesthetically pleasing. As rising costs and increasing demand for lim-
ited space have restricted the number of people who are able to procure prop-
erty, courts should protect the rights of those who can, and consider their
interest in comfort and architectural expression as well as the public's. Other-
wise the standards the courts use in applying the balancing test are inconsis-
tent, working to the disadvantage of the individual and perhaps ultimately to
the disadvantage of the public. This country has a long tradition of individu-
96. Id.
97. Jones, 305 N.C. at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
98. See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963);
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cerl. denied,
350 U.S. 841 (1955). Both courts seemed to assume that loss of property value would occur, but
neither required proof of such loss. See also Kolis, supra note 84, at 285-86; Turnbull, supra note
84, at 245 ("The problem with the cases turning on theories of preservation of neighborhood
character and property values seems not to be that character and values cannot be objectively
measured, but rather that they were not in fact measured and that measurement may have proved
that depreciation of value may not have occurred. .. ").
99. See Turnbull, supra note 84 (arguing that aesthetic regulation should be upheld only
when loss of property value can be shown).
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alism and freedom of choice. Permitting government to regulate design af-
fronts this tradition, risking what one commentator has described as "cultural
dictatorship."l10 In protecting architectural creativity, a concern the supreme
court has cited in justifying historic district zoning, 01 the courts can promote
the comfort and happiness of individuals and observe societal interests in
individualism.
The other limitation upon the general rule-that municipalities should
not delegate responsibility for promulgation of aesthetic zoning ordinances to
groups the General Assembly has not authorized to exercise the police
power' 02-also would not prevent a Reid-like result. A municipality could
still establish an architectural review board with power to enforce the zoning
regulations, 0 3 or the board of commissioners itself could bar a construction
plan as discordant with existing architecture.
In protecting architectural expression and the right to use one's property
as one desires, other possibilities besides changing the balancing test include
removing the presumption 1 4 that an ordinance is valid and applicable. This
presumption merely places one more burden on the landowner. The legisla-
ture might also step in and allow zoning of architecture only when the dwell-
ing is grossly discordant, or when it significantly reduces the value of other
property. This action would prevent the courts from possibly extending the
Jones test to architectural regulation, thereby eliminating the risk that land-
owners could be barred from building a house because of differences in aes-
thetic taste.
In conclusion, the Jones test should not be extended to residential archi-
tecture. Regardless of the means, the property owner should be permitted to
choose an architectural style he desires so long as the style does not signifi-
cantly harm others. In State v. Jones, while appropriately permitting the regu-
lation ofjunkyards, billboards, and similar public eyesores, the supreme court
also opened the door to regulation of architectural taste. Absent compelling
reasons, that door should remain closed.
MARC DAVID BISHOP
100. R. BABCOCK, supra note 83, at 8.
101. See A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298.N.C. 207, 216, 258 S.E.2d 444, 450 (1979).
102. See supra text accompanying note 30.
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-384 (1982) ("The city council shall provide for the manner
in which zoning regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of zoning districts shall be deter-
mined, established and enforced. . . in accordance with the provisions of this Article."). Appar-
ently, nothing in this statute would prohibit the establishment of an architectural review board
with power to enforce zoning regulations. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-384 to -392 (1982).
104. See Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 650-51, 122 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1961).
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